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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
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judgment entered against the

Thereafter Appellants caused to be filed a motion

to set aside the default, which motion was referred to the
Honorable Robert Owens, Judge Pro Tern, of the Fifth Judicial
District Court, and denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellants seek a reversal of the order denying the
setting aside of the Appellants1 default and an order remanding the
matter for trial on its merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellants were the owners of a leasehold in Iron County
State of Utah, upon which they operated a service station.

They,

along with others, were indebted to the Small Business Administration of the United States of America, which indebtedness was not
paid when due and judgment was taken accordingly.

Thereafter,

writ of execution was issued and the leasehold was sold at
sheriff's sale.
The Respondents, Sterling Griffiths and Donna Griffiths, his
wife, purchased the leasehold interest at the sheriff's sale for
the sum of $10,100.00. The Appellants remained in possession of
the subject real property as owners thereof during the six month
redemption period pursuant to law.

Respondents, on or about the

27th day of January, 197 5, commenced an action against the
Appellants, which aiaong other things requested that the Appellants
be compelled to pay reasonable rental value of the leasehold
interest during the redemption period (R- 1 ). On or about the
13th day of February, 197 5, the Appellants caused an answer to be
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Appellants' attorney was thereafter informed of this procedure,
and on or about the 5th day of September, 197 5, filed a motion to
set aside the default judgment entered by the Court (R-21).

An

order was submitted to the Honorable J. Harlen Burns, Judge of
the Fifth Judicial District Court, to set aside the default judgmen
entered on the 2nd day of September, 1975, and the Judge started to
sign the order and then did not complete the same (R-26).
Thereafter, at the request of Appellants, the matter was
referred to the Honorable Robert Owens, as a Judge Pro Tern, and the
matter was submitted to the Judge on memorandum.

The Judge, on or

about the 17th day of March, 197 6, entered his order denying the
motion to set aside the default judgment (R-32).
order that Appellants have sought this appeal.

It is from this
It is interesting

to note that notwithstanding the fact that judgment was granted by
the District Court on or about the 2nd day of September, 1975, to
date no judgment has in fact been presented to the Court for entry.
POINT I
APPELLANTS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD
HAVE BEEN GRANTED BY THE DISTRICT COURT.
(A) A judgment by default is granted when a party fails
to defend, even when testimony is taken and received by the Trial
Court.
The Trial Court, in its memorandum of opinion (R-3 2)
attempts to make Appellants' failure to appear a trial on the
merits rather than a default judgment.
-4-

Rule 55(a) of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure states:
"When a party against whom a judgment for
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead
or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and
that fact is made to appear, the clerk shall enter
his default." (Emphasis added)
In the case before the Court, the Appellants did not defend
because they were unable to defend.

Counsel for the Appellants

had already been scheduled for a court appearance in another
court, of which fact the Court had been previously advised (R-19)»
The Trial Court proceeded with the matter and awarded judgment even
though the Appellants were not afforded the opportunity to defend.
Even when testimony is taken, the judgment granted when the other
party does not or cannot defend is a judgment by default.

Rule 55

(b) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in part:
"• . .the court may conduct such hearings or order
such references as it deems necessary and proper."
The Trial Court in this matter did proceed in this matter, taking
testimony from one of the Respondents, after which it entered
judgment for the Respondents (R-38).

The testimony offered is

that of what a reasonable rental of the premises were, and that
appears to be what the award of judgment was upon.
claims of the Appellants were not even mentioned.

The meritorious
Rule 55(b) (2)

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure appears to be aimed at this
type of testimony for awarding a judgment.

If the Court had taken

testimony as to the claims of the Appellants, then a trial on the
merits might have been proper.

But in this matter, where they

did not have a proper opportunity to defend and no testimony was
-5-

taken as to their claims, a judgment upon the merits was not
granted but rather a judgment by default.
At the present time, no findings of fact and conclusions
of law or decree or order of judgment have been prepared, signed
or entered in this matter.

It would seem that since there have

been no specific findings in this matter, a judgment by default
and not a judgment upon the merits has been awarded to Respondents.
After a defendant has affirmatively pleaded and then failed
to appear to substantiate his case, it has been held that the court
may then enter a default judgment against him.

Schooler v.

Asherst, 11 Ky (1 Litt) 216 (1822).
In the case before the Court, the Appellants did not fail
to appear, but rather they were precluded from appearing because
their counsel had to be in another court at the same time as this
trial, which matter had been set prior to the time of trial in
this matter.
Also, in Peterson v. Crosier, 29 U. 235, 81 P. 860 (1905)
a case where the defendant and his counsel did not appear at the
time of trial at which point the trial court proceeded with the
action, a judgment by default was granted for the plaintiff and
not a judgment on the merits.

The factual situation in that case

gives rise to the proposition that even where there is testimony
taken, if the defendant fails to appear, the judgment granted is
a judgment by default.

Even though the trial court took testimony

in this case, a judgment by default was granted to the plaintiffs
and not a trial on the merits.
-6-

(B)

The trial court should have continued this case until

the counsel for the Appellants could be present.
A party is not granted a continuance as a matter of right,
but rather as an act of discretion by the trial court.

In Patton

v. Evans, 92 U. 524, 69 P.2d 969 (1937), the Honorable Court held
that a motion for continuance or postponment is left to the discretion of the trial court and where the inability of a party's
counsel to be present at the time set for trial because he is in
attendance at another court does not necessarily entitle the client
to a continuance.

The facts under Patton v. Evans, supra, and the

case before the Court are clearly distinguishable and even using
the dicta in the Patton case, it is easily determined that a
continuance should have been granted in this matter.
In Patton, the counsel for the appellant was engaged in
another trial in Federal Court when the Patton matter was called
for trial on March 10, 193 2, a date previously set by the court.
On March 10, 193 2, an attorney appeared who did not represent the
appellant's attorney and made oral statements that the attorney
for the appellant was engaged in the U.S. District Court in
Ogden, and asked for a continuance of the case before the State
Court.

The jury and all witnesses being present and ready, the

court denied the motion for continuance and proceeded with the
trial.

The Utah Supreme Court upheld the actions of the trial

court.

However, this Court stated at 69 P.2d 971:
-7-

M

. . .In the instant case it appears a jury had
oeen called and it does not appear that counsel
tor the defendant gave the clerk or the court
notice of his inability to try the case on the
morning of March 10th until the venire had already
arrived. A continuance would have been at the
expense of the county. There is not reason shown
why defendant's counsel could not have notified
the court or the clerk in time to avoid the calling
of jurymen. The motion was oral and very informal
by some other attorney representing defendant's
attorney. There is no objection to this, but
unless the court chooses to act without formal
motion, it has the right to have presented an
affidavit of the reason why counsel cannot try
his case. Counsel takes the risk when he sends
an attorney friend to the court to suggest the
continuance because the latter has been told the
participating attorney is engaged in another suit.
Under the circumstances, we see no abuse of
discretion."
In the case presently before this Honorable Court, the
counsel for the Appellants notified the Trial Court within three
(3) days after receiving notice of the trial setting that he would
not be able to attend, the reason being that he already had a
trial at which he must appear on that day (R-19).

This took place

approximately forty-five (45) days prior to the trial date.

The

Trial Court took no action on the objection of the Appellants'
counsel as to the trial setting, even after contacts by the
secretary of Appellants' counsel (R-28).

The Trial Court did

not hold any law and motion days between the time when the objection
was made and the time of trial so that counsel could make his
objections orally before the Court, and the counsel for the
Respondents was informed of the conflicting trial of Appellants'
counsel well ahead of the time of trial.
-8-

All of these facts, plus

the fact that the defendant had only the attorney of record as his
sole counsel, clearly distinguish this case from the Patton case.
The Court also stated in the Patton case, at 69 P.2d 971:
". . .certainly a trial court desiring to be fair
would, unless there were very important and urgent
counterconsiderations, not force to trial a case
where sole counsel was engaged in the trial of
another case."
When counsel has made his objections timely, informed all necessary
parties, and has taken steps necessary to have the trial time
changed for good cause, all of which are factors present in this
situation, many courts have held it an abuse of discretion for the
trial court not to grant continuances in the interest of justice.
112 ALR 603.
In cases where the counsel has not acted diligently to
have the trial changed and then not appeared, other courts have
upheld the trial court in its refusal to grant a continuance. The
distinction appears to be the efforts made by the trial counsel
and the reason for his inability to attend.

The facts in this

case clearly warranted a continuance of the matter, and the Trial
Court should have continued the matter rather than proceed to
enter a default against the Appellants.
POINT II
UTAH COURTS DO NOT FAVOR JUDGMENTS BY DEFAULT.
Judgment by default is a very harsh remedy for a trial
court to use when there are legal and factual issues in dispute
as there are in the present case. As was noted in the case of
-9-

Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 14 U.2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (1962):
"Judgments by default are not favored by the
courts nor are they in the interest of justice and
fair play. No one has an inalienable or constitutional right to a judgment by default without a
hearing on the merits. The courts in the interest
of justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a
full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the
merits." at 377 P.2d at 190.
The Appellants have not had an opportunity to present
their claims. The Trial Court took no action on the objection to
trial setting of the Appellants, but proceeded to give the
Respondents judgment after determining what a "reasonable" rental
of the property was. The Trial Court did not attempt to protect
any interest of the Appellants.

In Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.,

123 U. 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953), the court stated in weighing
the considerations given to each side where a default judgment is
sought to be vacated:
". . .on the other hand, the court is anxious to
protect the losing party who has not had the
opportunity to present his claim or defense.
Discretion must be exercised in furtherance of
justice and the court will incline toward granting
relief in a doubtful case to the end that the
party may have a hearing." at 260 P.2d 7 43
The case before the Court is one where justice would
dictate that the Appellants should be given their day in court.
As already shown in the facts of this matter, the counsel for the
Appellants has used due diligence in attempting to resolve the
problem of the trial setting, and there would have been no
prejudice to the Respondents in having this matter continued until
-10-

a time when the counsel for the Appellants could appear.
In Peterson v. Crosier, 29 U. 235, 81 P. 860 (1905), this
Court stated in a case which had proceeded to trial where the
defendant failed to appear, testimony was taken, and then a
default judgment was entered against defendant which he attempted
to have set aside on appeal, that:
" . . .the moving party must show that he has used
due diligence to prepare and appear for trial, and
present his defense, and that he was prevented from
doing so because of some accident, misfortune, or
combination of circumstances over which he had no
control. If, however, the record discloses mere
carelessness, lack of attention, indifference to
his rights on the part of applicant or his counsel,
he cannot expect an opportunity to redeem the past."
at 81 P. 862
The Appellants have met the requirements as set forth in
Peterson, supra, which when coupled with equity and the basic
right of a party to have his side of a case heard, would dictate
that the Trial Court acted incorrectly in not granting the
Appellants' motion to set aside the default judgment, and failing
to give the appellants their day in court.
As was stated in Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v.
Tolbert, 16 U.2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965):
" . . .It is in accordance with our rules, and our
decisional law, that where a default has been taken
against a party and there is any justifiable excuse,
the court, should be indulgent in setting aside the
judgment to afford him an opportunity for a trial
on merits, and any doubt should be resolved in favor
of doing so." at 402 P.2d 705
The Appellants in this matter had a justifiable excuse in
not appearing and since there was doubt as to what the Court
-11-

should do about the objection to the trial setting of the
Appellants and there were definite conflicts of fact and law
which the Court needed to resolve, this Court should reverse the
Trial Court and let a trial upon the merits proceed rather than
allowing a default judgment.
POINT III
APPELLANTS HAVE A VALID DEFENSE TO PRESENT BECAUSE AS A
MATTER OF LAW RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO RENTS FROM THE
APPELLANTS DURING THE PERIOD OF REDEMPTION.
The Respondents appear to be relying upon Rule 69(f) (6) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads in part as follows:
"The Purchaser, from the time of sale until the
redemption, and the redemptioner, from the time of
his redemption until another redemption, is entitled
to receive from the tenant in possession the rents
of the property sold or the value of the use and
occupation thereof. But when any rents or profits
have been received by the judgment creditor or purchaser or his or their assigns, from the property
thus sold preceding such redemption, the amount of
such rents and profits shall be a credit upon the
redemption money to be paid;"
This above-quoted section is identical to 104-37-37, Revised
Statutes of Utah (1933), which was interpreted in Local Realty Co.
v. Lindquist, et ux, 96 U. 297, 85 P.2d 770 (1938).
The issue involved in Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist, supra,
was whether the owner-mortgagor who was in actual possession of
real estate from the time of sale under mortgage foreclosure to
expiration of the redemption period was liable to the mortgageepurchaser at the sale for the rental value of the premises
-12-

during the redemption period.

The Utah Supreme Court held that

a purchaser at an execution sale has no right to possession of
the property until such time as the redemption period has
expired, and that the judgment creditor in possession of the
property is not chargeable for rent during the redemption period.
At 85 P.2d 775, the Court states:
"'An execution creditor is not entitled to possession
and rents of the property levied upon, before sale,
and before the time for redemption has expired.1
It is clear and undoubted that the judgment debtor
is, in contemplation of law, the owner of the
property during six months allowed for redemption
and that he has a right to its use and occupation.
We note briefly three other reasons why the owner
in possession should not be chargeable with rents
during the redemption period."
(Emphasis added)
The Court then goes on to explain other reasons why the owner in
possession shouldn't be chargeable during the redemption period
for rents.
The Respondents in this matter are attempting to obtain
rents from the Appellants who were the owners of the leasehold
of the property in question and also were the owners in possession
of the property.
In properly applying Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist, supra,
The Appellants do not have to pay rents to the Respondents during
the redemption period, as a matter of law, yet the trial court
granted the Respondents a judgment for rents during the redemption
period.

Such a ruling being contrary to the established law of

this State, should be reversed.

The Respondents, as noted in
-13-

Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist, supra, can only claim title to the
property upon the execution of a sheriff's deed or some other
conveyance, and until such title, they have no real interest in
the property except the right to obtain a deed to the property
if the property is not redeemed within the time period.

It

should be noted in passing that the assignees of the Appellants
have in fact redeemed the property from Respondents.

The

Respondents in this case should not be entitled to any rents and
the Trial Court's decision to grant such rents should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that based upon the foregoing
this Honorable Court should enter its order reversing the denial
of Appellants1 motion to set aside the default, and order that
the matter be remanded for a trial on its merits.
Respectfully submitted,
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Attorney for Appellants
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